Industrial development strategies in Caribbean countries: Trinidad and Tobago by St. Cyr, E.B.A.
CEPAL/CARIB 81/3/Add. 
16 February 1981 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION- FOR LATIN AMERICA 
Office for the Caribbean 
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
IN CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
Prepared by 
Eric St. Cyr 
Consultant 
(In collaboration with the staff- of the Trinidad 
and Tobago Institute of the West Indies) 
This monograph on the Industrial. Development Strategy of Trinidad 
and Tobago has been prepared for the CEPAL Office, for- the Caribbean by 
Mr. Eric St. Cyr in his personal capacity.. The views expressed are 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
P.ag,e 
4 
' I. Introduction - Origins of the Development 
Strategy 1 
II. The Manufacturing Sector in the Trinidad 
and Tobago Economy 14 
III. Strategic Choices in.Industrial Policy: 
Lessons of the Pre-1973 and Post-1973 
Periods 21 
IV. Appendices: I - V 34 




Origins of the Development Strategy 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 The twin island state of Trinidad and Tobago emerged from 
British colonial rule at Independence in 1962 and adopted a republican 
constitution in 1976. With a total land area of 1,980 square miles 
2 
(5,128 km ) and an estimated population of 1.2 million in 1980, its per 
capita GNP in 1976 was US$2,240. Until the discovery of oil in 19Q7 
this was a typical agricultural colony producing tropical staples 
for export to metropolitan centres. By contrast with the older, de-
clining sugar economy in Tobago, Trinidad was only opened up in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century, so that its plantation and 
sugar manufacturing technology was relatively modern. The oil 
industry added a measure of industrial diversification to the 
economy in the twentieth century and formed the basis of relative 
prosperity. As late as 1844 the population of Trinidad and Tobago 
was a mere 73,000. This was however to change rapidly, mainly on 
account of indentured Indian immigration (1845-1917), so that by 1901 
the population was 274,000 and 563,000 by 1946. This is evidently 
a country qf new settlement, rapid population and industrial grpwth 
and a land of opportunity. 
- 2 -
1.2 The Problem 
1.2.1 Fortunately it is no longer necessary to make the case for 
industrialization. With rapidly growing populations and consequent 
urbanization, the provision of the requisite infrastructure and 
utilities for civilized living has made the development of secondary 
industry a social imperative. The pioneering work of Colin Clark—^ 
had established, on a world-wide empirical basis, the connection between 
economic prosperity and the share of manufacturing activity in the 
2/ 
social dividend. The issue, as Dudley Seers— had reminded us, is 
not whether but how to industrialize. For one reason or the other 
colonies and former colonies (the countries of the so-called Third 
World) have found it relatively difficult to embark on a sustained 3/ 
process of industrialization. Lewis— has argued that this is due less 
to the popularly attributed political causes and rather more to the 
fundamentally economic cause of low factor productivity in their 
non-traded (wage) goods sector. It would seem however that, to the 
extent that old British colonial policy, based on mercantilist 
premises, either forbade or discouraged manufacturing pursuits in its 
colonies in competition with'home production, the development of 
secondary industry in colonial territories must have been at a 
disadvantage. 
1.3 . The Official View 
1.3.1 That official colonial policy was not favourably disposed 
towards industrial development in the British West Indies, and 
Trinidad and Tobago in particular, may be gleaned from official pro-
nouncements on the subject. After noting the heavy dependence of West 
1/ Col in Clark: The Conditions of Human Progress, Macmillan 
2/ Dudley Seers: "The Role of Industry in Development: Some 
Fallacies", Journal of Modern African Studies, I, 4 (1969), pp.461/5 
3/ W. Arthur Lewis: The Evolution of the International 
Economic Order, Princeton U.P., 1977 
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Indian colonies on exports of cane sugar, that sugar prices had fallen 
by half between 1881 and 1896 while world sugar output had risen from 
3.8m tons in 1882 to 7.3m tons in 1894, the Norman Commission nevertheless 
concluded that salvation lay in the restoration of the sugar industry 
to a profitable condition, agricultural diversification and land 
settlement, economy in public expenditure, emigration and welfare 
4/ 
services.— Earlier it was stated that "There is no prospect of 
manufacturing industries being established on any considerable 
scale"—^ and that "... for manufactured goods ... West Indian possessions 
are dependent on being able to find a profitable foreign market for ... 6 / tropical products".— The more celebrated Moyne Report had stated: 
As regards non-agricultural industries, we do not re-
commend that West Indian Governments should conduct or finance 
speculative industrial enterprises. There are, howevey, 
certain possible projects which Governments might do well 
to foster: e.g. the establishment of a cement works 
in Jamaica, possibly in co-operation with British 
manufacturers and the development of the local 
manufacture of coconut products in Jamaica and 
elsewhere. JJ 
Mercantilist inspired ideas were clearly giving way to liberalism 
with its emphasis on free market forces in international trade anfi 
the limited interference of Government in economic affairs. If 
however industry should be fostered this was to be done in co-
operation with British manufacturers. 
1.3.2 The war years (1939-1945) were to change the reality of 
the industrial sector in Trinidad and Tobago and force ambivalence 
into the official position. Buoyant demand and disrupted supplier 
stimulated residentiary industrial development. The doubling of 
4J Report of the West India Royal Commission, C8655, 1897, 
p.8, Para.44. 
5/ Op.cit., p.2, Para.13 
6/ Op.cit., pp.2/3, Para. 14 
JJ West India Royal Commission Report, Cond.6607, 1945, 
p.443, Para. 46 
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oil output between 1934 and 1938, massive construction activities 
associated with U.S. military activities and the stimulation of food 
production more than compensated for the reduced activities in the 
sugar industry and resulted in a considerable increase in incomes. 
The increased demand could not be met from traditional imports since 
shipping had been disrupted, the allied economies were on war footing 
and at any rate were recovering from the low capacity levels of the 
depressed inter-war years. In the circumstances a large number of 
small and large manufacturing and repair establishments sprung up 
8 / 
making a variety of foods, drinks, consumer items.— After consider-
ing the experience of the war years and the prospects for the future, 
Gallotti in 1948 is aware that: 
During the present economic crisis there is a tendency 
to restrict imports by direct prohibition ...„ If this 
tendency continues, local industries must continue to 
expand as they did during the war ... _9/ 
but still concludes that when the world returns to a 
healthy organization and trade ... the principle of 
comparative advantage should weigh more in determining 
long term policy than an assumption that industrial 
product ion ... or that one's own manufactures are 
preferable to other people's merely because they are 
one's own. 10/ 
8/ For a full discussion of the evidence see L. Best: "Inter-
national Co-operation in the Industrialization Process - The Case of 
Trijiidad and Tobago" in UNIDO: Industry 2000 - New Perspectives: 
Collected Background Papers, Vol.6, Industrialization Strategies and 
Country Case Studies, ID/CONF.4/3. January 1980, pp.153/299. 
_9/ Industrial Development in the British Territories of the 
Caribbean, Report prepared by the British Member of the Industrial 
Survey Panel appointed by the Caribbean Commission (R. Gallotti) 
1948, 3 Volumes, p.14, Vol.1 
10/ Op.cit., pp.56/57 
1.4 The Challenge 
1.4.1 The official policy, seeking to solve the depressed economic 
conditions in the West Indies by way of agricultural diversification, 
land settlement and social welfare, was challenged by Lewis who argued 
that 
The policy which seems to offer most hope of permanent 
success is for the islands to follow in the footsteps 
of other agricultural countries in industrialization ... 
No other policy seems to offer such permanent prospects 
as the development of local industries. 11/ 
Among the industries which Lewis named were refining sugar, making 
chocolate, utilising copra, making dairy products, i.e. resource 
12/ based industries. There ensued between 1939 and 1950 a long debate—r-
with the spokesmen of official policy, culminating in Lewis' celebrated 
13/ 
statement.— Lewis concluded that there was no choice for the 
islands but to industrialize, whatever the obstacles, and proposed 
a strategy for a combination of regional import substitution a.nd 
export promotion industrialization based on luring foreign 
industrialists by generous incentives and active promotion. 
1.5 The Response 
1.5.1 In Trinidad and Tobago official response to the growing 
demand for an active policy to foster industrialization was the 
appointment in 1947 of a committee under the chairmanship of the 
14/ 
governor, the Shaw Committee. This committee reported in 1 9 4 9 — and 
in many respects its stance was not inconsistent with traditional 
11/ W. Arthur Lewis, Labour in the West Indies: The Birth 
of a Workers' Movement, Fabian Society, 1939, republished by New Beacon 
1977, p.44 
12/ For a discussion of this debate, see L. Best, op.cit., and 
T.W. Farrell: "Arthur Lewis and the case for Caribbean Industrialization", 
1979 (mimeo) forthcoming, Social and Economic Studies 
13/ W.A. Lewis, Industrial Development in the Caribbean, Caribbean 
Commission. Reprinted from Caribbean Economic Review, 1951 
14/ Report of the Economics Committee 
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official policy. Thus it recognized "the important part which the expansion 
of existing industries and the addition of new ones (could) play in 
15/ 
equating the Colony's import and export values"— and was of the view 
that "secondary industries should be encouraged provided the quality 
(was) satisfactory, the price (did) not exceed that of previously 
imported goods, and their manufacture (did) not interfere with production 
of other goods for which there (was) an absolute or comparative advantage 16 / 
in the local or export markets".— It concluded that "Government policy 
should, therefore, be to aid in the establishment and expansion of 
industries rather than to hinder their development by a fiscal policy 171 which (aimed) mainly at customs and excise revenue".—-
1.5.2 The Committee recommended the establishment of the Economic 
Advisory Board to replace the less effective Local Industries Committee 
set up in 1941. It further proposed a number of incentives to industry, 
among t h e m — 
- release of foreign exchange for purchase of plant and 
machinery, 
duty free import of plant and equipment, 
- protective tariffs, 
- removal of barriers to exports (e.g. Venezuela's 30% sur-
tax) by the conclusion of agreements with foreign governments, 
exemption from income tax, 
assistance in obtaining raw materials for the manufacture 
of products for export. 
15/ Op.cit.,, p.3. 
16/ Op.cit., p.4. 
17/ Op.cit., p.116 
18/ Op.cit., pp.117/118 
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The first and last proposals related to the post-war economic conditions 
in which there was a dollar shortage and in which British industry had 
not been fully reconverted from war time production. In addition, 
a number of industries were identified as deserving special assistance 
among them rubber, citrus, lumber, biscuits, industrial alcohol, liquers, 
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, caustic soda, sugar bags, woven goods and 
19/ bagasse based goods.— 
1.5.3 In order to implement these recommendations, legislative action 
20/ 
was required. Thus the Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance (1950)— 
gave to pioneer industries duty free concessions on imports of capital 
equipment, exemption from payment of income tax for five (5) years, 
unlimited carry over of losses, and tax free distribution of profits. 21/ 
The Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Ordinance (1950)— as amended in 
1955 permitted the accelerated depreciation of capital in the post tax 
free period for pioneer manufacturers. In order to give special en-
couragement to cement production, the Cement Industry Development 
Ordinance of 1951 was also passed and was the first of a number of 
ordinances specially designed to encourage and protect large investments. 
1.6 Criticism 
1.6.1 The industrial promotion policies of the Colonial administration, 
with its fledgling ministerial system which came into being in 1950 
22/ was severely criticised by Williams.— Following Lewis, Williams 
19/ Op.cit., pp.119/122. 
20/ See Chapter 33, Ordinance No,3 of 1950. See also amendments 
of 1952/53, 1956 and 1961. 
21/ See Chapter 33, Nos.2 and 12 and Amendment No.48 of 1955. 
22/ Eric Williams, Economic Problems of Trinidad and Tobagp, 
Teachers Economic and Cultural Association Ltd., People's Education 
Movement Public Affairs Pamphlet No„l, Woodford Square, July 5, 1955, 
repeated at Harris Promenade, San Fernando July 19, 1955. 
- 8 -
contended that the only solution to the rapidly expanding labour force 
and the slow rate of growth of job opportunities in traditional 
activities was the creation of alternative jobs in tourism (short-run) 
and industry (long-run). He regarded the colonial administration as 
23/ taking an "easy-going attitude to industrial development"— of failing 
to afford protection to local industry, of not granting the incentives 
requested by the oil industry, and of relying on income tax exemption as 
its principal incentive. Williams proceeded to outline the Lewis 
strategy - a wide range of light industries as being the most favourable 
extension into the metal trades, importation of raw materials where 
necessary, accessing the requisite capital by appeals and incentives 
to foreign manufacturers, the involvement of government in industry 
where private investment might be unattracted, the establishment of 
industrial development corporations, protection where necessary. After 
noting that Trinidad had in its fuel supplies "one of the principal 
requirements for an enormous development programme designed to make 
24/ 
(it) the industrial centre of the entire Caribbean a r e a " — he be-
moaned the absence of appropriate government policies. Implicit in 
the analysis was the programme which ought to be implemented. 
1.7 The Strategy 
1.7.1 The details of the industrialization strategy outlined by 
Lewis and articulated by Williams are too well known to bear repetition. 
Suffice it to say that on the attainment of office in 1956, Williams 
set about to implement such a programme. Interestingly at the time 
of preparing the first five year plan Lewis spent "six weeks in Trinidad 
and Tobago in August and September" and "advised on the orders of 
priority to be allocated to the various Ministerial proposals and 
recommended a number of important modifications and departures from 
established ideas Government was also fortunate to obtain the 
advice and assistance of Mr. Teodoro Moscoso and Mr. Hubert Barton of 
the Puerto Rico Economic Development Administration who made a special 
23/ Op.cit., p.11. 
24/ Op.cit., p.22. 
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study of Trinidad's possibilities for industrial"development.— 
In Chapter 5-on Manufacturing Industries,.the-Plan remarks that the 
development programme.would emphasize."the.Public.Utilities, Water, 
Transport and. Road-Facilities,-and-Land-Sites,.the utilization of 
26/ 
which are important components, of.cost-in. manufacturing," — the 
training of the future members, of. the..labour.force in the new Technical 
School, in Port.of-Spain,-and-that.much, of the assistance to industry 
could."only. be granted-through.fiscal and. financial measures." 
Consistent with, the strategy an Industrial Development Corporation 
was to be set up which-"will.be. Government's. agent.in the execution 
of industrialization-policy!'.charged-with, industrial promotion, 
creating- the. atmosphere-where. industrialists-would-feel welcome to 
enter and ..encouraged., to- expand, -assisting: industrialists in choosing 
- s i t e s and recruiting., labour-and ..with, the preparation-of factory sit^s 
for lease to. industrialists«...-Finally .special-incentives were to be 
offered, to "create:parity-with-other-countries-where industries are 27 / already well'established".— 
1.7.2 Some critical-pieces of.legislation.followed in the next 
few years. Thus Act- No. 11. of 1958 established the Industrial 
Development-Corporation, . and local, industry was..protected against 
unfair, practices-by> the.Trade.Ordinance,-1958.and the Customs Duties 
(Dumping and-Subsidies)-Ordinance, of the same ~year<, -The principle of 
'no taxation-of.the. means, of-production! was-further advanced by 
Customs ~ (Amendment-) Ordinance,.. Act Nc-> 2 of-1959 - under which Section 
49A granted.exemptions-of. customs- duty.on.raw-materials for industry. 
There also, followed.,. as: was-the . case for. the cement-industry in 1951, 
a series of. special., ordinances..designed., to. give protection to 
exceptionally-large..investment^....Thus there-were- the Nitrogeneous 
25/ Foreword.to . Government - of -Trinidad-and-Tobago: Five Year 
Development.Programme:1958-19625 1957 
26/ Op.cit., p.13 
27/ loc.eit. . 
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Fertilizers Industry (Development) Ordinance (1958), the Lube Oil and 
Greases Development Ordinance (1961), the Petrochemicals Industry 
Development Act (1962) and the Tyre Manufacturing Industry Development 
Act (1967). Buttressing these arrangements have been a number of 
institutions which emerged later. The principal among these are the 
Management Development and Productivity Centre (1965), the Development 
Finance Corporation (1970), the Small Business Division, of the IDC 
(1970), the Caribbean Industrial Research Institute (1971) and the 
Bureau of Standards (1972). Most recently the International Marketing 
Corporation (1978) has been established. 
1.7.3 During the sixties it began to appear that the area for manoeuvre 
within the existing strategy had narrowed. The incentive programme had 
narrowed the tax base, petroleum output - and so revenues - had slowed 
down, recurrent expenditure implicit in the expanded social and economic 
infrastructure had reached a high level. Still expectations were rising 
and job opportunities growing far too slowly to cope with the population 
surge and the influx into the public sector of formerly self-employed 
persons. By the time the Third Five Year Plan was being drafted it 
was evident that the programme was not working, and blame was being 
placed on the non—viability of the small insular market» This lead 
to modifications to the strategy, notably the emphasis on the regional 
market, and the formation of CARIFTA in 1968 represents a movement 
closer to the original Lewis recommendation. Thus attempts were made 
to harmonize fiscal incentives to industry throughout the CARICOM region 
and to increase the benefits to the region by relating the extent of 
fiscal incentives to the quantum of local value added. A category 
of 'enclave' industry was also created. This was given,effect in the 
Fiscal Incentives Act of 1973 as amended by the Fiscal Incentives 
28/ 
Act of 1 9 7 9 , — which inter alia repealed the Aid to Pioneer Industries 
Ordinance and replaced 'pioneer' status by "approved industry" 
status. 
28/ See Act No. 22 of 1979. 
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1.8 The Achievements of the Programme 
29/ 
1.8.1 In 1955 Williams had observed—that since 1950, 101 manu-
facturers had been given pioneer status, i.e. at a rate of 25 a year. 
The first five-year plan had also remarked that the incentives pro-
30/ 31/ gramme had had relatively meagre results.— In its ten year review— 
the Industrial Development Corporation reported that "in all there w^s 
a total of 158 new factories, and an estimated investment of $231m with 
a full-time employment of 8,377 people (plus the indirect employment 
created by these jobs). There were 80 new applications for the grant of 
Pioneer Status and 34 had been brought forward from 1967. The number 
of duty remission licences increased from 997 in 1959 to 5,020 in 
1968, in respect of goods valued at $18m and $84m respectively in the 
two years and duty foregone of $2,600 in 1959 and $20m in 1968. 
1.8.2 The optimism with which the programme was viewed is clearly 
reflected in the Second Development Plan where the period prior to the 
formation of the Industrial Development Corporation in February 1959 
was contrasted with the post-I.D.C period and projections into the 
future made. The data are as follows: 
The Pioneer Industries Programme 
Invest- Direc£ 
Number ment Employment 
1. Pioneer Establishments in operation 
before February 1959 56 $ 40.2m 2,713 
2. Pioneer Establishments between 
February 1959 and June 1963 43 44.5m 1,96} 
3. Pioneer Establishments in operation 
in June 1963 99 84.7m 4,666 
4. Factories under construction or 
planned at June 1963 40 173.2m 2,2?5 
5. Present and prospective Pioneer 
Factories 139 257.8m 6,921 
— —1 1 • • " — ' -
Source: Second Five Year Plan 1964-1968, p.220 
29/ Op.cit., p.10 
30./ Op.cit., p.13 
31/ The Trinidad and Tobago Industrial Development Corp. 1959-69 
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After noting that the manufacturing sector grew at an average annual 
rate of 9.7 per cent between 1951 and 1961, much of the growth coming 
after 1955, the conclusion is drawn that "the effect of the programme 
to encourage manufacturing industry, therefore, appears clearly in 
32/ these data".— 
1.8.3 Optimism seems to have waned somewhat so that the Third Five 
Year Plan 1969-1973 could remark that "the manufacturing sector performed 
fairly well, increasing its output by about 7 per cent per annum between 
1963 and 1968. Increases in production were dominated by petrochemicals, 
but there was also a good record of growth in garments and food 
33 / 
processing."— But the strategy clearly seems to have engendered 
considerable doubt as is evidenced by the projections of the plan and the 
discussions of solution to the worsening unemployment situation. The 
Plan remarks that "full employment will (not) be achieved until 
1983-1985", but that "full employment will be brought nearer should 3 4 / large discoveries of crude oil or natural gas be m a d e " . — 
1.8.4 In the post 1970 period emphasis in the implementation of the 
strategy has been given an added dimension. The development of the small 
business sector is increasingly being stressed in the programmes of the 
Industrial Development Corporation while heavy industry is being emphasized 
through the National Energy Corporation which in 1978 replaced the Co-
ordinating Task Force. Between 1970 and 1979, the Small Business 
Division of the IDC has granted loans of $20.99 million to 1,171 small 
35 / businesses, 483 of which were engaged in manufacturing activity.— 
32/ Second Five-Year Plan, 1964-1968, p.27. 
33/ Third Five-Year Plan, 1969-1973, p.15 
34/ Op.cit., pp.16/17 
35/ See I.D.C. Newsletter Vol. 1, January-March 1980, p.14 
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1.9 The Seventies 
1.9.1 The industrialization strategy was being carried out against the 
background of the prosperous fifties and sixties. During these two 
36 / 
decades, L e w i s — has told us that industrial output in the MDC's was 
growing at 5 per cent per year, world trade at 8 per cent and output in 
the LDC's at 6 per cent, and that increasingly the latter wpre exporting 
manufactures. This was a period of world economic expansion. However, 
since 1974 the world economy has been in depression following on the 
monetary and oil crises, and the ensuing dislocations, world inflation 
since 1972, and the slowing down of world trade to a 4 per cent rate of 
growth since 1974. 
1.9.2 The major constraint on the success of the programme had been 
identified as the shortage of an investible surplus. The oil boqm and 
the rapid inflow in petroleum revenues thus removed the constraint and 
37/ 
the programme is being implemented.— The experience to date is that 
the technology has been made available through various joint venture 
arrangements, markets have been found, and as before the export oriented 
sector promises fair. The critical question remains whether the strategy 
will work and the economy transformed. We return to this question in 
the Section III below where the strategic options and choices for the 
future are evaluated in the context of structural factors affecting the 
functioning of the economy. 
36/ W. Arthur Lewis: "The Slowing Down of the Engine of 
Growth" American Economic Review, September 1980, pp.555/564 
37/ See Appendix III for a description of the Point Lisas 
programme 
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II. The Manufacturing Sector in the Trinidad and Tobago Economy 
2.1 Economic Structure 
2.1.1 The key fact in the structure of the Trinidad and Tobago economy 
is the dominant position of the petroleum sector. Prior to 1973, oil 
traditionally provided about 25/30 per cent of the G.D.P. and Governmept 
revenues, and accounted for the bulk of the export trade. With the oil 
boom of 1973, when prices quadrupled, and with increased off-shore 
production, the share in G.D.P, reached 48 per cent in 1.975. The 
statistical performance of the other sectors reflects the dominant 
position of oil. Other 3-ong term trends worthy of note are the de-
clining absolute and relative importance of agriculture, particularly 
export agriculture, the rising importance of the services sector, 
particularly Government and Finance, and the stable share of the con-
struction and the manufacturing sectors. 
2.1.2 It is to be noted that the expansion of the construction sector 
is an essential feature of all booms both on account of capacity 
creation on the supply side and on account of the increased demand 
for residential housing as incomes rise. During the late seventies 
the construction sector has increased its share marginally from a 
low of 5 per cent in 1975, at the peak of the petroleum boom, to 8 per 
cent in 1980. However, while output has increased, this has been 
accompanied by massive inflation in building costs and land prices 
since the industry is operating beyond capacity. 
2.1.3 The fledgling manufacturing sector hovered at 9 per cent to 
10 per cent in the two decades 1950 to 1970. The petroleum boom re-
sulted in its share falling to 6 per cent in 1975 but this has since 
risen to about 7 per cent in 1980. To the extent that manufacturing 
is to perform the role of the engine of growth in the long'term its 
dynamism must be regarded as critical. Tables 2 and 9 illustrate 
the main structural features of the economy. 
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2.2 The Public Sector in the Economy 
2.2.1 The emergence of active government has been an essential feature 
of the Caribbean attempt to amelioriate social and economic conditions 
in the post war period, moreso since Independence. Because of its 
petroleum sector, public sector revenues in Trinidad and Tobago h^ve 
always been sizeable and buoyant. Thus current revenues in 1951 amounted 
to $62.6m or 20.3 per cent of G.D.P and the current surplus then was 
$13m i.e. about 20 per cent of revenues. With the implementation of 
the First Five-Year Plan (1958-1962) and the Second Five-Year P ^ n 
(1964-1968), accumulated reserves were run down, and the improved 
social and economic infrastructure resulted in rising recurrent expenditure 
at the same time that fiscal incentives to industry were narrowing the 
tax base. The implied fiscal squeeze is illustrated by three years: 
$ Millions 1958 1962 1967 
Recurrent Revenue 130.0 165.8 326,8 
Recurrent Expenditure 97.4 155.8 213.3 
Recurrent Balance 32.6 9.8 13.5 
Development Expenditure 28.0 62.0 52.1 
Source: Second and Third Five-Year Plans 
2.2.2 This position changed dramatically from 1974. Firstly, between 
1974 and 1980 Government's revenues increased substantially and ranged 
from 32 per cent of G.D.P in 1974 to 44 per cent in 1980. Current 
surplus was every year substantial and in 1980 exceeded $3,000m. 
The impact of the public sector on the economy is however better measured 
by the share of Government expenditure in G.D.P. Current expenditure 
increased from $476m in 1973 to $2,818m in 1980, its share rising fjrom 
18.6 per cent to just over 20 per cent. However capital expenditure 
increased from $130.5m in 1973 to $3,155.9m in 1980 so that the total 
share of Government expenditure - current and capital - in the G.D.P 
was a staggering 42.4 per cent in 1980. Table 3A shows the increasing 
- 16 -
importance of the public sector in capital formation since 1974 while 
Table 3B presents the data on central government financing. 
2.2.3 During the seventies the Government has become 1 increasingly 
38 / 
involved in industrial and commercial activities.— It has equity 
participation in 48 companies in agro-industry, petroleum, finance, 
communications and manufacturing. From 1973 to June 1980 its participation 39 / in these enterprises amounted to an investment of $2,941m.— 
40/ 2.3 The Structure and Performance of the Manufacturing Sector— 
2.3.1 Exclusive of sugar manufacturing and oil refining, the manu-
facturing sector is relatively small and relatively new. The data 
on this sector are given in Tables 10, 11 and 12. As pointed out in 
41/ 
a UNIDO S t u d y — there was already in 1940 a fledgling residentiary 
manufacturing sector in the country and this was further stimulated 
by the closure of the economy by World War II and the high incomes 
associated with the boom conditions of the U.S. military presence. 
Appendix IV gives a list of the industries in operation in 1942/43. 
More recent surveys indicate the importance of food processing industries, 
textile and clothing, furniture and building materials, principally clay 
block and cement. During the decade of the sixties there was 
considerable expansion in food processing and in the textile and clothing 
sector. But by far the biggest growth took place in the assembly—type 
industries producing consumer durables for the domestic and regional 
market. This trend has continued into the seventies as Table 10A 
indicates, though it would be important to point to the relative success 
of food processing and the relative decline in the textile/clothing 
trades. Increasingly the domestic market has dominated as foreign 
38/ See White Paper on Public Sector Participation in Industry 
Nos. 1 and 2 
. 39/ Accounting for the Petro-Dollar 1980 
40/ For a recent exhaustive study see T.W Farrell, "The Structure, 
Organization and Performance of the Manufacturing Industry in Trinidad ^nd 
Tobago, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto 1979 
41/ L. Best, op.cit. 
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exchange problems put a brake on the CARICOM trade. 
2.3.2 It would seem that in this phase import substitution industries 
dominated. True the fertilizer industries (industrial chemicals) are 
export oriented. But growth in export promotion industry has been 
relatively unimportant compared to import substitution industry. To 
the extent that the industries emphasized have been based on imported 
components and a demand determined strategy, to that extent it follows 
that the dynamism of the sector is determined by the extent to whiph 
other sectors of the economy (the staple export sectors) can earn 
the requisite foreign exchange. 
2.3.3 Some indication of the number of establishments and the em-
ployment generated in the manufacturing sector is given in Table 11. 
Food processing, the textile and clothing trades and assembly type 
industry stand out both as regards size and growth. The detailed 
sector data in Table 12, indicate sluggish employment growth, poor 
productivity performance except in Metallic Products where there has 
recently been started the production of producer goods. There has 
been tremendous inflation of earnings, a trend consistent with the 
movement of costs and prices throughout the country. 
2.4 Export Performance 
2.4.1 Historically, Trinidad and Tobago has been an integral part 
of the western economic system, performing the role of staple producer 
for export and servicing its needs by imports. During the twentieth 
century it changed from being a producer of agricultural staples 
(tobacco, sugar, cocoa, coffee, copra, citrus, bananas) to being a 
mineral exporter (oil, asphalt). It remains today a trading nation. 
The perceived need to diversify the economy was two pronged, consisting 
in part of a shift of the production base from agriculture and mining 
to manufacturing, in part to a reduction of dependence on traditional 
exports and markets. Production and export dependence on a single 
dominant staple continues to be a structural feature of the economy. 
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2.4.2 The direction of trade clearly illustrates the predominance 
of petroleum. Imports from Venezuela and Saudi Arabia are simply 
crude oil for processing. Imports from the U.S.A., Canada, the United 
Kingdom and Japan are mainly of manufactured goods. The U.S.A. takes 
the vast bulk of exports, mainly petroleum products. Table 7 illustrates. 
2.4.3 The importance of CARICOM in the trade of Trinidad and Tobago 
is illustrated by Table 7A. CARICOM accounts, in the seventies, for 
only a small share of total trade, and even in this petroleum products 
have dominated. While Trinidad and Tobago continues to enjoy a favourable 
balance of trade in CARICOM, as it has always done, the exclusion of 
petroleum products shows that a large favourable balance up to 1975 
has been changed to a deficit of $112m in 1979. The importance of the 
CARICOM market in the diversification strategy was recognized in the 
Third Five-Year Plan, and in 1970 out of a total export of manufacturers 
(ISIC groups 6, 7 and 8) of $36.lm, the CARICOM market took $34.lm, 
i.e. 94 per cent. The restrictions on exports to CARICOM which 
accompanied the balance of payments problems in 1977 and the ensuing 
'tit for tat' policy of Trinidad and Tobago constituted a serious blow 
to this very sensitive sector. 
2.4.4 Table 8 gives in detail the trade data in manufactures by SITC 
two-digit codes. It is to be noted that the data do not include trade 
in manufactured food products, beverages or tobacco. Indications are 
however that there is a sizeable and rapidly growing market for manu-
factures in Trinidad and Tobago amounting in 1978 to approximately 
$2,282m i.e., imports of $l,965m plus production of $459m minus exports 
of $142.6m. This is indeed a rough estimate, including as it does 
heavy equipment coming in/going out from use in the oil industry and 
showing up in the trade date, as well as substantial quantities of capital 
equipment which the sector cannot supply. Yet a market of $2.2 billion 
for manufactures is sizeable indeed. Appendix IV lists the principal 
items of manufactures exported in 1978. 
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2.5 Inflationary Trends in the Economy 
2.5.1 Traditionally, Trinidad and Tobago has been a price taker in 
international trade. Until 1971 price inflation has been moderate 
and wage increases have more or less reflected real gains in wage 
incomes. The long term trends are illustrated by the following data: 
Average Annual Percentage Increases 
Period Index of Retail Prices Index of Minimum Wage Rates 
1951-1956 2.2 7.1 
1956-1960 2.8 5.3 
1960-1965 2.1 10.7 
1965-1969 4.3 4.0 
2.5.2 Since the seventies this has changed and there have developed 
external and internal inflationary pressures» Table 4 gives the trends 
in the main inflationary indicators at hand. Major increases in import 
prices since 1972, expansion in money supply, production bottlenecks 
at home and an active trade union movement, have contributed to high 
42/ rates of price and wage inflation.— 
2.5.3 Price control of basic items, supported by Government subsidy, 
selective credit control by the monetary authorities, and wage guidelines 
administered by an Industrial Court (1965) have been the main weapons in 
anti-inflation policy. Because of the protection given to industry 
through negative listing, quality and price controls are deemed necessary 
to protect consumers, moreso in times of buoyant monetary demand. 
These are administered through a Prices Commission (1968), a Bureau of 
Standards (1972) and a Consumer Affairs Division of the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. 
42/ See E.B.A. St. Cyr: "Rising Prices - An Exploratory 
Theoretical and Empirical Study of Trinidad and Tobago", C.S.O Research 
Papers, No.7, 1974 and "A Note on the Trinidad and Tobago Inflationary 
Experience, 1965-1976", Social and Economic Studies (forthcoming). 
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2.6 Oil Reserves and Projections-— 
2.6.1 In 1977 oil reserves were estimated at 1,400 million barrels 
(one-half proven, one-half probable) and thought adequate for 10 ye^rs 
at current rates of production of approximately 80 million barrels per 
44/ 
year. Reserves of natural gas were put at 17 trillion— cubic feet 
(again one-half proven, one-half probable)„ At the then estimated 
projected use of 300 million cubic feet per year, the time horizon was 
infinite. 
2.7 Rate of Exchange 
2.7.1 All the data given are in Trinidad and Tobago dollars (TT$). 
Up to May 1976 the rate of exchange was TT$4o80 = £1 sterling (U.K) 
in fixed relationship. Since May 1976 a new fixed rate of exchange has 
been set at TT$2.40 = U.S. $1. 
Ill. Strategic Choices in Industrial Policy: Lessons of the 
Pre-1973 and Post-1973 periods 
3.1 Situation 
3.1.1 The industrialization strategy pursued has been fully articulated 
in the First, Second and Third Five-Year Plans which have detailed the 
institutional changes proposed, the policies to be followed, and given 
the supporting analyses. Our observations lead us to the view that the 
Plans have been faithfully followed, especially so far as the promotion 
of manufacturing industry is concerned. The evidence also suggests that 
the objectives of action have been achieved, if measured by the numbers 
of manufacturing establishments granted fiscal concessions, the quantum 
of investment attracted, the acreage of industrial estates developed 
and factory shells established, and most recently the number of small 
business establishments granted financial and other assistance. And 
43/ See also the Ministry of Petroleum and Mines document; Best 
Use of our Petroleum Resources, January 1975 
12 44/ One trillion cubic feet = .10 cubic feet 
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yet it would be fair to say that the strategy has not worked as anticipated. 
Transformation of the economy from dependence on petroleum has not occurred 
neither has there emerged a dynamic industrial sector capable of clearing 
the labour market. In fact it would seem that the economy has become even 
more dependent on oil, that agriculture, especially export agriculture, 
has declined absolutely, that the unemployment problem remains as in-
45/ tractible as ever,— and that rather the services sector, with Government 
46/ in the lead, has expanded to take up the slack.— 
3.1.2 A careful reading of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans reveals 
that in addition to the problems of implementation identified the 
financing of the programme was thought to be critical. Thus the Second 
Plan (p.66) argues that: 
... every step will have to be taken to ensure that adoption 
and implementation of an oil and natural gas conservation 
policy so as to bring about a rate of production that will, 
over the longest period possible, yield the optimum in revenue 
in the light of the country's need for time to make the required 
adjustments ... 
In reviewing the Second Plan period 1964/1968, the Third Plan (p.44) 
noted that 60 per cent of the public sector's development programme 
was financed internally compared to the original Plan target of only 
30 per cent. Still, in discussing the financing for the 1969/1973 
period the Third Plan identified the need for about 40 per cent external 
financing, considers this to be a "somewhat tight financing situation" 
(p.145), and leaves a financing gap of $19.5m. 
45/ See T.M.A Farrell: "The Unemployment Crisis in Trinidad and 
Tobago: Its Current pimensions and some Projections to 1985", Social 
and Economic Studies, 1978 
46/ See Eric St. Cyr: The Services Sector and Full Employ-
ment " . T r i ^ W a d a n d T o b a g o R Vol. 2., No.10, June 1978. 
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3.1.3 Nor have the massive inflows of funds in the post-1973 period 
altered this conception. Thus in December 1974, the Ministry of 




91. Government's majority participation in most of the 
projects under way and under consideration, coupled witty 
the provision of infra-structural requirements for such 
projects would place a very heavy burden on it. 
47/ 
The whole tenor oí the Bobb Report— is of a massive financial 
squeeze, resulting from rapidly rising expenditure commitments and 
a slowing rate of growth of revenues. The changed financial position 
of the Government was however admitted by the Minister of Industry 
and Commerce in a speech to the Trinidad Manufacturers Association 
i^ March 1980. The Minister painted the picture as it was before 
1973, prior to the so-called windfall of petro-dollars, and went on to 
outline the far brighter post-1973 situation, in particular noting 
that the^e was "a fundamental departure in the concept of industrialization 48/ possibilities in Trinidad and Tobago". — 
3.1.4 It is highly questionable however whether financial constraints 
could have been the major difficulty in industrialization. The data 
49/ 
assembled by Mclntyre and W a t s o n — show that for every year between 
195|6 and 1967 current outflows in respect of factor payments, manage-
ment services and royalties exceeded by a substantial margin capital 
inflows for direct foreign investment. The corporate sector was 
clearly generating surpluses part of which was being reinvested. 
47/ Report of the Committee to Review Government Expenditure, 
18 October 1978, and Addendum to Report dated October 18, 1978, 
January 31, 1979. 
48/ See IDC Newsletter, Vol.1, January - March 1980, p.3 
49/ A. Mclntyre and B Watson: Studies in Foreign Investment 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean, No.l., Trinidad and Tobago, I.S.E.R. 
1970. 
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Even in the financially critical year 1973, when the public revenues were 
at rock bottom, net inflows for direct investment were $128.4m, while 
there was a net outflow of investment income of $170.6m.—^ In the 
post-1973 surpluses continue to be generated and sizeable portions of 
this has accrued in the public sector. One of the conclusions of the 
UNIDO study— / is that, as a whole, the economy consistently generates 
large surpluses, but that these may accrue in specific sectors. It would 
seem therefore that the problem of financial constraint is a structural 
rather than global matter. 
3.1.5 The current sustained windfall to national income, government 
revenues and foreign exchange holdings consequent on the new conditions 
of trade in the international petroleum industry has served once again 
to dramatise the choices to be made in industrial policy. By the second 
half of the sixties, some of these choices had already been coming to 
the fore as the Golden Age of the petroleum boom of the late fifties 
tailed off sharply. By the tim$ the Third Five-Year Plan was being 
prepared in 1968 it was plain that the post-1950 strategy had not been 
diversifying the economy fast enoughior far enough to solve the problem 
of ynemployment and to localise economic control. Equally it was plain 
that the widening of markets through the pursuit of Caribbean economic 
integration would not by itpelf induce the desired changes. Then, as 
now, two basic questions remained. The first was how to generate 
enough structural interdependence between and within agriculture and 
manufacturing so as to eliminate the lop-sidedness of the petroleum 
economy. The second was how the dominant petroleum sector itself 
could be pressed into service to that end. 
50/ C.S.O. Balance of Payments of Trinidad and Tobago, 1975, p.2. 
51/ L. Best, op.cit. 
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3.2. The Third Plan: The Solutions Proposed —— , • • • 
3.2.1 The Third Five-Year Plan broached the answers to these critical 
questions (pp. 16/17). Diversification was to be achieved by a break-
through in domestic agricultural, livestock and fishing production, 
while ttye yields per acre of traditional export crops such as sugar, 
cocoa, and citrus increased; through the development of exports of 
manufactures on a large scale to regional and world markets; and 
through a socially controlled expansion of the tourist industry. 
The strategy envisaged an increasing proportion of local ownership 
and participation with considerably more economic decision-making 
being made internally. While diversification proceeded as a long-
term process, employment creation was to be tackled "by more 
immediate measures, principally a large Construction programme". 
Education and training were to assume "a critical significanqe'1. 
3.2.2 Appropriate policy measures were to be instituted to give 
effect to these objectives. Thus fiscal, monetary and financial 
policies were to "create the framework for greater mobilization of 
local financial resources" by establishing more local ownership of 
financial institution^, encouraging investment and penalising 
consumption. Commercial policy would protect potentially viable local 
industries, encourage the export of manufactures, strengthen the 
regional integration movement and develop wider relations with Latin 
America. An incomes policy would provide guide posts for wage and 
salary increases, encourage the reinvestment of profits and supervise 
price movements. In the productive sectors, national participation 
would be deepened, inter-industrial relations would be developed in 
agriculture and industry, and inter-related complexes would be 
emphasized in manyfacturing, particularly in the promising new field 
of petro-chemicals. 
3.2.3 The assumption was that diversification through these approaches 
would be brought nearer should large discoveries of crude oil or natural 
gas be discovered in the East and North Coast marine fields which were 
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being explored at the time. Thus the Plan argued (p.17): 
If crude oil is discovered, the revenues and foreign exchange 
will indirectly provide the necessary resources. If, on the 
other hand, natural gas is discovered, while the foreign 
exchange and revenue accretions may not be as great as in the 
case of oil, the natural gas could be directly used to build 
up a large integrated petro-chemical complex, producing both 
intermediate and final products. 
In othet words the Third Five-Year Plan visualized a programme of 
diversification to which the energy sector would provide a. stimulus 
through: 
(a) higher incomes, and so demand/expenditure on agro-
industrial outputs - the demand effect; 
(b) higher levels public revenues, public and private savings 
and therefore of funds for investment in agriculture and 
industry - the capital formation effect; and 
(c) new sources of raw materials which would serve as inputs 
(feedstock) tp productive activities - the supply effect. 
3.2.4 It follows that the central issue therefore became the^growth 
path of the dominant petroleum sector. Was there sufficient reserve of 
oil and natural gas? Unfortunately it was still not possible to say 
with certainty what the marine areas were likely to yield» It was 
therefore argued that long-terpi economic projections could not be made 
with any firmness and the discussions of strategy was thereafter 
conducted "only in qualitative terms" with the aid of some hypothetical 
numbers to indicate the possibilities (pp. 110-112). It was estimated 
that 200,000 new jobs were to be created so as to achieve full employ-
ment in 1983 and that the manufacturing sector would generate 25 per 
cent of this. The average capital cost of one job was assumed to be 
$23,000 at 1968 prices, so that the total net investment required to 
attain full employment by 1983 amounted to $4^600m. The exercise went 
on to show that this could be financed if the national savings rate went 
up from 7.5 per cent of Net National Income in 1968 to 14 per cent 
by 1983, if G.D.P and National Income both rose at 5 per cent per annum 
over the period, and further if Net External Borrowing by the Public 
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Sector, reinvested profits of foreign enterprises and New Capital 
Inflows all increased at the same rate as National income. 
3.2.5 The central question which this exercise was intended to answer 
was "how much of this needed sum are we in a position to provide for 
ourselves?" (p.111). On the assumption of a change of savings habits, 
the answer was a very large part. It was in this perspective that the 
petro-dollar windfall arrived in late 1973 almost at the same time as 
new finds of oil a nd gas, and just before the introduction of the new 
petroleum legislation in 1975. Henceforth the petroleum sector would 
deliver both a huge financial surplus much of it to the public coffers, 
from sales of oil at dramatically elevated prices, and large quantities 
of potential feedstock in the form of natural gas. But the strategic 
choices, it seems remained to be articulated. The period since 1974 
has therefore witnessed: 
(a) huge investments in infrastructure development (roads, 
water, gas, electricity, port) and downstream activities 
(iron and steel, fertilizers) most associated with the 
Point Lisas estate (See Appendix III); 
(b) a recurrence of the problem of financing in spite of hugely 
increased incomes and revenues and a much greater level 
52/ of all-round liquidity including foreign exchange;— 
(c) a manifest difficulty in activating investment and output 
in the productive sectors of agriculture and manufacturing: 
the absolute level of real output in agriculture has 
actually fallen, while manufacturing output has fluctuated 
about a constant level even though it has been concentrated 
in demand-led assembly activity and demand has been buoyant. 
52/ See Bobb Report, op.cit. The Central Bank in 1980 required 
commercial banks to hol4 15 per cent of incremental deposits in statutory 
reserves with it in a desperate attempt to curb excess liquidity in 
the system. 
53/ See Review of the Economy, 1980 
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3.3. The Questions Today 
3.3.1 The following questions, together constituting the critical choices 
regarding industrial policy, suggest themselves, and there is dire need 
for a framework capable of integrating them in a coherent whole. 
3.3.2 The first and most important question is: how much surplus can 
be generated by the staple sector? This question is fundamental since 
the staple (sugar, minerals, bananas or tourism) has been the avenue by 
which the Caribbean-type economy has accessed the international market 
With those things in which it has a world advantage and from which 
therefore it has been capable of earning quasi-rents at the critical 
phase of the product cycle: the so-called Golden Age. In addition 
surplus from the staple accrues in foreign exchange, often a necessary 
(if not sufficient) resource for transformation. Where the staple is 
a wasting asset such as oi^ or natural gas, as is the case at hand, the 
finite time horizon further complicates matters and raises such 
considerations as reserves and how they relate to present and future 
54/ 
consumption technologies, rates of output/depletion—for optimal 
benefits to the soceity, pricing and taxation policies. This question 
was posed as early as the Second Plan (p.66) but is the point at which 
the conventional analysis often stops. 
3.3.3 Secondly there is the question: where will the surplus accrue? 
Will it accrue in the corporate, the public, or the private domestic 
sector? This question relates critically to the structural/institutional 
characteristics of Caribbean-type economy, and depending on how it is 
answered there arises quite different options. Mclntyre and Watson^-^ 
have shown that while the Trinidad and Tobago public and private domestic 
sectors were short of inveptment funds in the critical sixties, the 
corporate sector consistently generated surpluses which it repatriated. 
54/ For a recent discussion of the problem see D. Pantin: 
"Depletion Theory and Petroleum Planning: the Case of Trinidad and 




Other writers in thè field have not been unaware of this problem. 
Thus Eric Williams concludes the section on "An Incomes Policy -
Wages and Prices" of his Reflections on the Industrial Stabilization 
Act, 1965 as follows: 
If we could get the oil and sugar companies and other 
expatriate Companies to ... channel funds into agricultural 
and industrial development, then this will go a long way 
towards utilizing profits in the interest of the 
development of the country. 
In the present era the public sector is in f inancia.1 surplus and has 
embarked on a number of sizeable investment projects. At the same 
time however, the private domestic sector, and in particular small, 
unincorporated businesses, are short of funds. To the extent that the 
corporate sector is integrated internationally within transnational 
corporations whose global objectives determine the investment activities 
of their branches, and to the extent that entrepreneurial activity 
might not be the forte of the public sector, to that extent is the 
sector in which the surplus accrues crucial to its utilization. 
3.3.4 Thirdly, in what form does the surplus accrue? Does it 
accrue as tax revenue or as the profits of enterprises? In general 
in countries like Trinidad and Tobago with a tradition of private 
entrepreneurial activity, private enterprises are more likely to use 
surpluses for reinvestment in productive activity since the profit 
urge may be more imminent. While it is true that the public sector 
has a substantial stake in commercial and industrial activity, this is 
relatively recent and often it has been designed to keep an enterprise 
from closing down and destroying jobs. An assessment of the past 
performance of the public sector as an entrepreneur is still to be 
made, but the presumption of its ineffectiveness to date is strong. 
3.3.5 Fourthly, does the surplus accrue in locations where it is 
associated with the collaborant resources viz. entrepreneurship, 
management and technology? It may be tempting to argue that these 
resources pan be brought together; however by itself this very act 
would be entrepreneurship. In the capitalist system the firm 
(Ricardian, Marshallian, or TNC) contains within itself the combination 
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of resources to make good use of the surplus it generates, ploughing it 
back in the natural process of growth/accumulation. Where the surplus 
accrues in the public sector the question would be that of creating 
appropriate locations where critical resources occur together. Within 
the Trinidad and Tobago public sector attempts to create these locations 
include the Co-ordinating Task Force and its successor the National 
Energy Corporation, the National Agricultural Corporation, and the 
Office of the Corporation Sole. The idea is to group state enterprises 
under holding companies the more ef fectively to manage their reporting 
to the Corporation Sole and also to reduce the extent of civil service 
bureaucracy. 
3.3.6 Fifthly, are there transfer mechanisms which shunt funds from 
areas of surplus to areas of deficit, both measured in relation to the 
collaborant productive factors discussed? This is clearly a question of 
the efficiency of the financial system, assuming as is not unreasonable 
that entrepreneurship, management and technology are less mobile than 
finance. The financial system of Trinidad and Tobago is far from developed 
and exhibits peculiarities derived from its origins for serving the export-r 
import trade. In the past fifteen years there has been a number of 
institutional changes in the financial system and others are planned. 
It does seem however that while there continues to be funds for such 
purposes as commerce, real estate and personal consumption (consumer 
durables, travel, etc.) risk capital, in particular for industry and 
agriculture, is short. An area of industrial banking remains under-
developed despite the efforts of the Agricultural Development Bank 
(1968), the Development Finance Corporation (1970), and the Industrial 
Development Corporation. It is in this context that the issue of the 
establishment of a stock exchange and the d i v e s t m e n t of the 
Government's equity holdings are currently discussed. 
3.3.7 Sixthly, for any given surplus, what are the expenditure 
options? In light of stated objectives what is the most effective 
balance between (a) Welfare Expenditure; (b) Staple Expansion by 
(i) exploration to secure the staple; and (ii) downstream activity 
to increase the returned value per unit of output produced; 
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(c) directly productive activities in manufacturing and agriculture 
for diversification; and (d) investment in infrastructure to complement 
all these? It is evident that these expenditure options are not 
separate and distinct from each other. Obviously infrastructure is 
needed for productive and consumptive activity, and this was emphasized 
especially in the First Development Plan. Staple expansion and output 
diversification are also easily conceded as making for increased economic 
betterment. Often however welfare expenditure is regarded as a 
derivative, grudgingly conceded, and summarily removed at the first 
sign of financial stringency. It might well be however that yre If are 
expenditure is as integral a part as any other in the expenditure 
options since it enhances the quality of life of the citizenry thereby 
giving a stake in the fruits of the economic system. 
3.3.8 Finally we pose what might be the most difficult question of 
all, namely, is there some critical minimum of supply-led productive 
activity in the economic system which inter alia makes for a viable size 
of market on the one hand, and on the other generates essentia}, scale 
elements in such areas as the supply of productive and managerial 
skills, technological know-rhow, and intermediate inputs? The question 
derives from one of the oldest propositions viz. Say's Law of Markets. 
If there is a positive inclination in the answer, this question may prove 
to be the most fundamental of all, since for the size of Trinidad and 
Tobago (area, population, income, resources), it might determine 
the level at which the system is viable. 
3.3.9 The Third Five-Year Plan, and subsequent action, might not have 
given sufficient attention to the subsidiary questions which lay behind 
the issue of where the national surplus accrued. For this reason too 
much emphasis might have been placed, in the choice of an industrialization 
strategy, on winning more surplus, i.e. an oil bonanza, on transferring 
it to national control (through policies of localization) and particularly 
to public sector control (nationalization). Wider and more complex 
subsidiary questions have been posed above. These do not seem to have 
been perceived sufficiently sharply in the strategies for industrial 
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development. Hence when the oil bonanza arrived and the huge surplus was 
actually achieved, manifest difficulty has been experienced in translating 
them into an effective programme of diversification. Agriculture has 
suffered, wage and welfare policies in general have left widespread 
dissatisfaction, and manufacturing has either drifted along the path 
of demand-led expansion or seems tied to limited processing for pre-
carious export markets. Small business development has remained a 
separate and knotty issue, and the use of housing construction as a 
short term measure has not been feasible. 
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Summary List of Legislation-and Institutions 
for Industrial Promotion 
A. Incentive Legislation 
1. Aid to Pioneer Industries Ordinance, 1950 as amended by 
Aid to Pioneer. Industries-(Amendment) Ordinance, 1952/53 
- Aid to Pioneer Industries (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956 
Aid to Pioneer Industries.(Amendment) Ordinance, 1961 
Provided for : 
a) Duty free importation- of capital equipment for firms 
granted pioneer status 
b) Exemption from payment of income, tax for 5 years 
(could be extended to 10 years) 
c) Unlimited carry over of losses incurred 
d) Tax free distribution of profits in tax holiday 
period or two years thereafter. 
2. Customs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, Section 49A 
Raw materials and supplies exempt from customs duties 
for pioneer and other approved industries. 
3. Customs Duties (Dumping and-Subsidies) Ordinance, 1958 
Compensatory duty may be imposed-on dumped goods to 
protect local industry. 
4. Trade Ordinance, 1958 
Permits the prohibition of imports to protect-local industry. 
5. Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) Ordinances. 1950 as amended by 
Income Tax (In Aid of Industry) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1955 
Permits accelerated depreciation in post tax. free period for 
pioneer industries. 
6. Fiscal Incentives Act, 1973 as amended by 
Fiscal Incentives Act, 1979 
Provides for the harmonization, of incentives in CARICOM, 
Relates the quantum of fiscal, incentives to.local value added. 
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7. Special Ordinance for very large investments 
a) Cement Industry (Development) Ordinance, 1951 
b) Nitrogenous Fertilizer Industry (Development) Ordinance, 1958 
c) Lubricating Oils and Greases Industry (Development) Ordinance, 1961 
d) Petrochemicals Industry Development Act, 1962 
e) Tyre Manufacturing Industry Development Act, 1967 
B. Institutions 
1. The Industrial. Development Corporation, established February 1959 by 
Act of Parliament, 1958 
Small Business- Division- of. the IDC established 1970 (grants Joans up 
to $200,000). 
2. The Management Development. Centre, established 1973 but functiqned as 
arm of IDC since 1 9 6 5 c 
3. The Development-Finance. Corporation., . 1970 , established-under Companies 
Ordinance. 
4. Caribbean. Industrial. Research-Institute, 1971. 
5. Bureau of Standards, 1972. 
6. Export Promotions Division of. the-Ministry.of Industry and Commerce 
established 1968 to stimulate non-traditional exports. 
7. International Marketing Corporation, 1978» 
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APPENDIX III 
1/ A Note on Point Lisas — 
Point Lisas is a large industrial estate situated on the western side 
of Trinidad and located mid-way. between Port of Spain and San Fernando. 
It abuts the sugar and oil industries.. The estate is owned by a private 
limited liability.company, the Point Lisas Industrial and Port Development 
Company (PLIPDECO). and. was incorporated in 1966. Originally conceived in 
1956 by businessmen active in the South Trinidad Chamber of Commerce to 
stimulate port development and heavy industry in the south, the company is 
now almost wholly owned by the Government of Trinidad-and Tobago, Iî  its 
many years of. active promotion of its estate as an industrial site for 
large international industry, the company succeeded in attracting only one 
large client viz. Federation Chemicals Limited in 1958, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Grace,, the international giant. The Government had however 
all along been sympathetic to its endeavours as indicated by its payment 
2/ for a feasibility study undertaken by Arthur D. Little in 1965. —' 
The Government became a large share holder of the company, somewhat 
accidentally, when in 1970 it purchased majority holding in Caroni Ltd. 
a subsidiary , of Tate, and Lyle-s. and. subsequently acquired the remaining 
shares to establish Caroni.(1975) Ltd. From the inception of PLIPDECO, 
Caroni Ltd. had taken equity participation in exchange for land. With the 
onset of the petroleum, revenues in. 1973, the Board of PLIPDECO negotiated 
the formal, taking by Government of.the-reins of the. company, a move which 
brought.together.the growing-surpluses of the country and the industrial 
plans of the country. 
The estate comprises. 1,500 acres-of fully developed industrial, land 
reclaimed from the marshes by 6 feet of fill, adequately drainec}, and now 
served by connecting roads.and internal roadways, and the other critical 
infrastructure, of. water, piped natural gas, and a modern deep water port 
1/ See Articles of Association, Progress Report on the Development of 
Point Lisas - Report No. 1, July 1978 and Reports of the Co-ordinating 
Task Force. 
2/ See Third Five-Year Plan 1969-1973, pp 306/7 
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with heavy gantry cranes. In addition, the Electricity Commission has 
invested heavily in the provision of substantial quantities of electricity 
on site, through the installation of a complex of gas turbine units. In 
addition to Federation Chemicals and.the joint venture Tringen Fertiliser 
Company between the Government and. Grace, which came into production in 
1978, the two large industries which are. well advanced are the iron and 
steel complex (ISCOTT) and Fertrin, a joint venture fertilizer company 
between the Government and AMOCO.,. the international oil major. From the 
former will be produced sponge iron, steel billets and wire rods produced 
from imported lump ores and pellets aimed at the export market in part, 
while the latter will produce fertilizers for export from natural gas 
feedstock. 
A number of other, heavy industries..are at.a planning stage, viz. an 
aluminium.smelter possibly a joint venture CARICOM project based on 
Jamaican/Guyanese ores, a methanol plant, and an LNG plant. There are 
also provisions on the estate for so called "downstream" industries based 
on iron and-steel, petrochemicals and aluminium.,. and. various service 
industries such as engineering. .In addition, PLIPDECO envisages the develop-
ment of housing.complexes, and the ancillary , community and compiercial 
services associated with a large industrial, and residential area. 
It has been suggested that we are witnessing at Point Lisas, inter 
alia, the change in the Trinidad and Tobago staple export from oil £o 
natural gas, which latter, because of its inherent nature, is being 
embodied in iron and steel and.fertilizers prior to export. To the 
extent that some down-stream processing, is taking place, this must add 
to local income from the staple. The corporate form is also ip, 
process of transition from a wholly owned subsidiary of a transnational 




List of Industries in Operation in. Trinidad in 1942/43 
Part I Large. Scale- Secondary.Industries- Manufacturing Goods 





Lime and Limestone 
Part II . . Secondary.Industries of. an.Advanced kind Producing 
Goo4s-for-Local- Consumption but not to any Substantial 
Extent for Export 














Grape Fruit (Canning) 
Ice 
Ice Cream 
Jams and Jellies 





















4. Medicines, Toilet Preparations, etc, 
Alcohol 
Bay rum 






5. General Industries 
Acetylene 





















Part III Minor Industries-and Craf ts-conducted Principally 
in the Homes of the Workers 
Basketry Jewellery 
Boots and Shoes Barrels 
Brooms and Novelties (including 
Brush-making wooden toys) 
Charcoal Burning Pottery 
Coconut Fibre Preserves (fruits, 
Mats chutneys, sauces) 
Dress-making Tinware 
Engraving Gold 
and Silver Work 
Source: Industrial Development in the^ British Territories 
of the Caribbean, Vol. II, pp 10/11. 
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APPENDIX IX 
Principal- Items in- Export- of- Manufactures in 1978 
SITC Code 















I t em. of-Value- $1 - mil1ion or more 
642-rll„120 Paper Bags without handles 
642T.11.200- Cardboard boxes 
642T22.000 Envelopes 
642-93.200 . Toilet paper 
653-70.000 Knitted-or crocheted fabrics 
- ( not elastic) 
653-81*100- Sanitary napkins - Pads 
665r-11.100_ Beer,, wine, and similar bottles of glass 
665-11.910 Other bottles of glass 
692-31*000- -- Gas containers-of iron ox steel 
697-11.110. Gas stoves, ranges, etc. 
698-85.100- Crown corks 
718-42.100 Oil mining, machinery (re-e;xpor1fcs) 
719-22.900 Other air and vacuum pumps, faqs, 
blowers, etc. 
725-01-. 100- Domestic-refrigerators electrical 
725^03.000 Electro-mechanical-domestic appliances 
731-63.000-. - Containers-equipped for carriage 
734.10.000. Flying machines (re-exports) 
735-91.100 . Tugs over 250 tons (re-exports) 
735-92¿900 Other dredgers, fire floats, cranes, etc 
841-11.«300 Trousers and shorts, men and bqyis, 
non-knitted. 
841-25.100. Brassieres 
841-43.420. Knitted panties for women anc} girls 
. (Also dresses, shirts, stockings, pull-
overs and hats) 
85: Footwear (Slippers.,, footwear of rubber, plastic and leather) . 
Miscellaneous 893-09.900 
Manufactures 8 9 7_ l l t l 0 0 
897-11.200 
899-62.900 
Plastic articles not elsewhere specified 
Articles of jewellery - gold 
Articles of jewellery - silver 
Other orthopaedic appliances etc» 
(Side fasteners, tooth brushes). 
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TABLE 1 
POPULATION TRENDS: TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
1 
Census Years Mid-Year Estimates 






Year '000 % Increase Year '00)0 
1844 73.0 1971 1030.0 
, - 1 : 1 . , ! , . . . 
1901 273.9 2.1 1972 1043.0 1.3 1985 1385,8 
1911 333.6 1.0 1973 1067.8 2.3 1990 1502.6 
1921 365.9 1.3 1974 1067.0 1.4 1995 1625,8 
1931 412.8 2.4 1975 1081.6 1.4 200Q 1753,5 
1946 563.2 3.3 1976 1098.2 1.5 
1960 828.0 1.2 1977 1118,5 1.6 
1970 931.1 1978 1137.5 1.7 
1980 1979 1156.1 1.9 





l , " • 1 1 1 1 11 1 " ' 1 1 ! ' ' '• I' I " 1 
Factor Cost Factor. Cost GDP Manufacturing 
Current Prices 1970 Prices Manufacturing Percentage 
1951 308.3 - 29.1 9.4 
1960 865,9 - 91,4 10.6 
1970 1,630.9 1,630.9 150,7 9.2 
1971' 1,796.3 1,658,9 163.0 9.1 
1972 2,039.4 1,746.6 193.1 9,5 
J-97̂ 5 2,554.7 1,784.9 220,2 tij,6 
1974 4,101.5 1,798¿6 275,7 6,7 
1975 5,496,7 1,923,6 342,5 6»? 
1976. 6,502.3 2,126.5 429,2 6.6 
1977 8,552,2 - 523.1 6,1 
1978 9,501.6 - 631.1 6,6 
1979 11,499.7 773.2 6,7 
1980 14,081.9 967.5 6.9 
Source: Central Statistical Office.(CSO), The Grosses Domestic 
Product of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, ̂ nd 
Annual Statistical Digest. Review of the Ecpnomy, 
1980. 
TABLE 3A 
THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO ECONOMY 
(TT$million) 



















1951 308.3 62.6 - 49.6 13.0 - - - 20.3 
1960 865.9 - 100.9 37.3 - - - 16.0 
1970 1,630.9 324.2 3.3 273.2 51.0 111.2 383.5 23.5 19.9 
1971 1,796.3 355.9 7.9 340.6 15.3 118.9 459.5 25.6 19.8 
1972 2,039.4 413.8 1.5 408.7 5.1 140.9 549.6 26.9 20.3 
1973 2,554.7 493.9 0.9 476.3 17.6 ; 130.5 606.8 23.8 19.3 
1974 4,101.5 1,306.9 80.8 637.6 669.3 341.8 979.4 23.9 31.9 
1975 5,496.7 1,816.0 31,2 773.3 1,042.7 428.9 1,202.2 21.9 33.0 
1976 6,502.3 2-, 302.6 0.3 979.1 1,323.5 891.8 1,870.9 28.8 35.4 
1977 «,552,2 2,981,0 6.0 1,162.9 1,818.1 1,094.0 2,256.9 . 26.4 34.9 
1978 9,501,6 3,083.1 2.5 1,483.9 1,*00.2 1,409.6 2,892.6 30.4 32.4 
1979 11,499-7 4,037,0 0.1 1,247.5 1,789.5 1,943.6 4,191.1 36.4 35.1 
1980 14,081.9 -6,179.4 48-2 2,818.9 3,360.5 4,155.9 5,974.8 42.4 43.9 
Source: Review of the Economy 1980 
TABLE 3A 
THE PUBLIC. SECTOR IH. INVESTMENT EXPENDITÙRE 

























as % of GDP 
Government 
Investment 
as % of 
Total Domestic 
Investment 
1970 1623.5 136.6 1383;3 - 377.4 201.2 81.1 23.2 21.5 
1971 1799.1 179,6 1506.5 561 ;0 260.9 103.6 31.2 18.5 
1972 2033.4 209.9 1770.3 563.1 331.2 138.1 27.7 24.5 
1973 2472.7 233.0 1950.1 540.8 341.3 146.5 21.9 27.1 
1974 4003.0 290.9 2223.9 766.9 488; 9 -220.5 19.2 28.8 
1975 5382.2. 424.2 3535.-3 1074.7 649.4 379.5 20.0 35.3 
1976 6220.8 467.8 -4093.3 1362.2 833;6 597.8 21.9 43.9 
1977 7198.8 50Ò.9 4768.8 1790.7 1024.5 806.5 24.9 45.1 
•c-U1 
1/ Excludes public enterprises 
21 Êxcludes public enterprises. 
Source: International.Sources XIBRD) 
TABLE 3A 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING 
(TT$million) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Current Revenues 380.4 439.1 1180.0 1668.1 2126.7 2685.4 2706.8 
Current Expenditure 421.5 456.0 708.7 904.4 1232.6 1531.4 2164.0 
Current Surplus/Deficit- -41.1 -16.9 471.3 763.7 894.1 1154.0 542.8 
Capital Revenues 32.1 51.8 240.3 217.4 237.1 266.4 262.7 
Capital Expenditure 124.1 107.7 278.7 353.2 729.9 975.2 1584.4 
Overall Surplus/Deficit -133.1 -72.8 432.9 627.9 401.3 445.2 -778.9 
FINANCING 
Net External Borrowing 36.4 55.5 -15.8 -20.4 -79.7 366.7 385.5 
Disbursements 44.5 65.9 47.3 10.9 9.5 382.0 394.8 
Amortization 8.1 10.4 63.1 31.3 89.2 15.3 14.3 
Net- Domestic Financing 96.7 17.3 -417.1 -607.5 -321.6 -811.9 393.4 
Banking System 35.8 6.2 -488.3 -757.3 -464.8 -1160.4 -
(Treasury Bills) (21.6) (1.1) (-4.4) (-13.6) (-11.3) (13-5) -
(Securities^ (8.3) (-4.1) (-6.2) (-4.7) (27.8) (23.4) -
{Other Credit) (1.3) (6.5) (-4.8) (-13.0) X-25.2) (-13.9) -
(Change in Cash Balances) (4.6) (2.7) (-472.9) (-726.0) (-456.1) (-1183.4) -
OTHER-DOMESTIC FINANCING. 60..9 11.1 71.2 149.8 143.2 348.5 -
Source: International Sources (IBRD) 
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TABLE 4 

















1970 2.5 3.8 2.1 20.3 -
1971 3.5 6.6 4.5 27.6 8.3 
1972 9.3 10.7 9.2 22.3 7.8 
1973 14.8 12.1 22.4 0.9 22.5 
1974 22.0 11.9 32.0 32.8 59.3 
1975 17.0 28.5 10.0 50.7 25,4 
1976 11.7 21.7 3.5 38.1 7.0 
1977 11.8 11.7 14.2 31.7 9.8 
1978 10.2 24.7 7.3 43.2 
1979 14.7 19.6 17.2 
1980 18.7 - 1 23.5 40. 7 — 
T—n—t——T—T 
1/ January/June 1980 compared to January/June 1979 
_2/ May to May 
3/ Excluding mineral fuels 
4V Narrow money 
5/ January to August. 
Source; Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
- 48 -
TABLE 5 

















1951 20.8 35.0 - - 141 
1960 42.4 77.5 - - 218 (1967:250) 
1968 66.9 150.7 - 642.6 240 
1969 57.4 154.1 - 648.8 237 
1970 51.0 154.8 - 611.4 216 
1971 47.1 145.5 109.8 568.6 213 
1972 51.2 144.4 104.3 629.5 231 
1973 60.6 141.4 120.0 459.0 181 
1974 68.1 130.8 128.3 411.0 183 
1975 78.6 85.7 126.5 381.4 160 
1976 77.8 117.6 138.0 372.6 201 
1977 83.6 99.3 149.6 377.1 173 
1978 83.8 85.9 157.9 696.6 145 
1979 78.2 82.9 169.7 666.8 140 
Source: Central Statistical Office. 
TABLE 3A 
VISIBLE TRADE SHOWING IMPORTANCE OF MANUFACTURES 
(SITC GROUPS 6, 7, 8) 
(TT$ million) 
























1951 117.0 - - - 154.0 10.9 92.9 -37.0 
1960 437.0 - 9.7 7.9 502.0 22.7 216.2 -65.0 
1970 487.3 168.2 76.2 47.8 557.3 47.4 321 = 2 -700.0 
1971 467.9 232.3 72.9 70.8 706.1 52.1 459.0 -238.2 
1972 524.8 286.5 77.9 55.5 814.5 64 » 6 527.5 -289.7 
1973 697.7 452.8 75.6 62.8 804.1 75.9 486.2 -106.4 
1974 1973.5 1566.6 140.9 81.8 1090.7 116.5 628.8 882.8 
1975 2206.4 1594.2 136.9 105.6 1615.2 150.0 1094.8 591.2 
1976 2643.1 2140.3 151.5 131.5 2119.3 182.7 1469.1 523.8 
1977 2891.5 2463.2 153.1 95.7 2324.8 213.4 1581.1 566.7 
1978 2999.5 2487.8 204.5 142.8 2825.5 251.3 1950.4 174.0 
1979 - - - - . 3593.8 - - 115.1 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Quarterly Economic Reports. 
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TABLE 7 
DIRECTION OF TRADE 
(Percentage Shares) 
Year 1970 1975 1977 1970 1975 1978 
Country Exports to Imports from 
U. S. A. 46.4 66.4 70.2 16.2 21.6 20.5 
Canada 1.4 1.2 1.1 4.4 2.6 3.8 
United Kingdom 9.6 3.8 2.0 13.3 8.8 12.5 
Venezuela 0 0 0 24.6 0.9 1.1 
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 9.4 26.4 21.9 
Japan 0.6 0 0 2.5 3.5 5.5 
CARICOM 9.6 6;1 5.4 2.4 2.8 3.4 
Other 32.4 22.5 21.3 27.2 33.4 31.4 
Source Central Statistical Office, Quarterly Economic Reports. 
TABLE 7A 
IMPORTANCE OF CARICOM TRADE 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
1. Exports f.o.b. 93 83 90. 110 232 237 288 . 264 265 265 
2. Petroleum as 
% of 1. 34 36 32 39 55 42 52 58 58 59 
3. Imports c.i.f. 26 25 40 38 59 91 125 130 159 220 
4. Balance (minus 3.) 67 58 50 72 173 146 163 134 106 45 
5. Balance Excluding 
Petroleum 33 20 21 25 45 46 13 -19 -49 -112 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Overseas Trade. 
TABLE 2608A 
EXTERNAL TRADE IN MANUFACTURING: 1970-1978 
(TT$million) 
SITC (R) CODE 1 9 7 0 
XD 
1 9 7 2 
XD 
1 9 7 4 1 9 7 6 1 9 7 8 
M X M X M X xD M X xD M X 
61 Leather 0.52 - - 0.95 - - 1.3 - - 3.2 - — 3.7 _ -
62 Rubber Manufacturing 3.60 0.5 0.33 4.7 0.88 0.75 9.4 0.66 0.48 17.6 0.36 - 30.1 0.2 -
63 Wood, Cork 3.25 0.2 0.12 - 3.6 0.12 - i.3 0.22 0.17 9.9 0.20 0.18 17.8 0.2 -
64 Paper 39.34 2.6 2.4 25.9 3.5 3.4 56.1 7.5 7.3 65.0 12.3 11.8 68.9 10.1 9.8 
65 Textile, Yarn, Fabric 39.8 2.1 1.2 54.0 1.7 0.8 66.5 4.7 3.9 102.0 7.6 6.7 117.6 7.6 6.3 
66 Non-metal Minerals 8.3 6.4 6.3 11.6 5.0 5.9 18.0 7.1 6.8 32.2 5.2 4.4 63.2 3.8 3.0 
67 Iron and Steel 35.6 0.6 0.16 48.2 0.35 0.17 102.5 1.14 0.35 160.2 1.6 0.4 284.0 2.6 0.1 
68 Non-ferrous Metals 4.3 - - 7.2 - - 10.5 0.24 0.21 11.8 0.39 0.32 21.1 0.2 0.15 
69 Manuf. of Metals NES 24.9 4.2 45.5 - 3.6 42.1 6.7 5.5 81.5 7.8 7.1 126.0 9.3 7.8 , 
71 Non-electric Machinery 71.8 4.0 0.29 143.7 3.2 - 126.1 4.6 - 388.6 25.8 - 437.8 18.0 0.2 S 
72 Electrical Machinery 26.3 1.3 0,50 48.6 2.44 1.74 40.9 10.9 9.8 100.2 14.7 13.2 182.6 8.4 6.9 1 
73 Transport Equipment 37.4 3.9 0.1 64.5 3.4 - 73.2 3.9 0.18 346.6 14.6 0.13 406.9 48.9 0.4 
81 Sanitary Fixtures 2.9 - - 5.3 - - 4,9 - - 7.4 - - 13.1 - -
82 Furniture 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.5 0.9 0.9 2.3 1.4 1,3 10.0 1.3 1.3 14.6 0.3 0.3 
83 Travel Goods,Handbags 0.9 0.15 0.15 1.2 0.26 0.26 1.3 0.4 0.4 2.0 0.16 0.16 3.3 0.2 0.2 
84 Clothing 5.0 10.6 10.5 8.9 15.2 15.2 12.8 16.3 16.2 24.5 17.8 17.7 30.1 15.6 15.3 
85 Footwear 8.1 1.1 1.1 8.8 1.6 1.6 10.1 3.1 3.1 18,7 4.3 4.3 . 21.7 1.7 1.7 
86 Photo - Optical Goods 7.0 0.5 - 12.5 , 0.9 - 11.1 0.8 24,6 1.2 - 35.4 0.5 -
89 Misc. Manufactured Items 21.2 4.6 4.1 30.7 7.7 7.1 33.1 12.0 11.1 63,4 16.1 15.1 87.1 15.0 13.9 
Total 341.2 40.1 32.8 527.3 47.9 41.2 628,5 81,5 66,6 1469.1 131.2 82.-6 1965.0 142.6 74.7 
M = Imports c.i.f. X = Total Exports f.o.b. Xp = Domestic Exports f.o.b. 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Overseas Trade, Various Issues. 
TABLE 9 


















Communi c a t ic nti 
Finance, Insui 
Real Estate, 





































1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
19.8 13.7 41.2 46.0 56.6 55.6 
94.4 109.1 135.5 139.5 147.5 173.8 
116.9 133.4 125.9 106.5 106.3 107.1 
361.1 358.1 418.1 699.3 1842.4 2635.7 2963.7 3700.5 3566.8 4093.5 4933.7 
150.7 163.0 193.1 220.2 275.5 342.5 429.2 523.1 631.1 773.2 967.5 
32.2 39.8 45.0 47.9 45.5 58.5 64.7 94.7 125.0 157.7 152.1 
95.4 133.5 160.7 175.8 236.7 277.9 407.4 573.6 652.1 785.1 1135.0 
260.1 269.5 293.0 375.5 403.2 450.4 676.6 811.8 966.3 1125.9 1322.4 





















333.2 352.3 376.0 833.2 1058.9 1367.9 1792„3 
278.8 447.1 535.2 707.4 998.9 1290.0 1596.7 
290.9 424.3 472.3 559.8 720.6 1041.5 1150.3 
112.9 129.9 157.6 219.8 262.1 303.5 369.3 
94.9 127.1 137.5 164.2 189.7 203.0 267.4 
1630.9 1796.3 2039.4 2554.7 4101.5 5496.7 6502.3 S552.2 9501.6 11499.7 14081.9 
i ource: Central Statistical Office, The Gross Domestic Product of the Republic-of Trinidad and Tobago, 
Review of the Economy, 1980. 
« 
TABLE 9A 
SHARES IN THE GDP 




22,0 20.0 20.0 27.0 45.0 48.0 46.0 43.0 38.0 36.0 35.0 
9.0 9.0 10.0 -9.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
6.0 7.0 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 8.0 
Finance 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.8 6„8 8.1 8.2 8.3 10.5 11.2 11.3 
Government 8.4 10.0 10.3 9.1 7.1 7.7 7.3 6.9 7.6 9.1 8 . 2 
Rest: Transport, 
Distribution etc. 46=0 46.0 44.0 40.0 28.0 25.0 26.0 29.0 30.0 30.0 31.0 
Source: Central Statistical Office, The Gross Domestic Product of the Rep-ublic 
of Trinidad and Tobago, Review of the Economy, 1980. 
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TABLE 10 
TRENDS IN MANUFACTURING OUTPUT 
(Net Output $m) 
ISIC Sector 1953 1957 1966 
31 1/ Food, Beverages and Tobacco — 9.3 17.8 27.6 
32 Textiles, Clothing and Footwear 2.5 3.1 5.6 
33 Furniture and Wood 1.6 1.9 ' 
43.8 
34/39 Other Manufacturing 10.3 25.8 j 
3 2/ Total Manufacturing — 23.7 48.6 77.0 
1/ Excludes sugar manufacturing 
2/ Excludes oil refining and sugar manufacturing. 
Source: Central Statistical Office: Industry 1957; and 
Survey of Business Establishments, 1966-1968. 
TABLE 10A 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT FACTOR COST IN 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (CURRENT PRICES) 
BY INDUSTRY GROUP 
(TT$million) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 31.1 38.2 46.8 47.0 53.6 62.2 85.5 .102.1 115 o 7 158.6 171,5 211.0 271.1 
i 
Textile Garments and Footwear 11.1 14; 9 14.3 14.3 16.3 17.6 23.7 25.6 37.4 48.6 69 o0 80,9 92.0 
Printing, Publishing and Paper 9.9 11.3 13.2 13.8 15.8 19.0 26.1 33.9 34 c 8 47.7 61-2 71.4 117.8 
Wood and Related Products 6.2 7.6 8.3 8.0 8.7 13. 5 17.4 24.8 33.4 38.2 45,2 59.9 72.2 
Chemicals and Non-metallic 
Minerals 16.9 20.5 23.4 26,2 33.9 33.6 36.6 42.6 53.4 76.2 81.7 96 o 5 132 „9 
Assembly-type and Related 
Industries 23.4 31.3 37.9 46.6 57.4 63.1 71.1 96.1 135.0 134.1 173.9 216.8 243.5 
Miscellaneous Manufacture 4.3 5.3 6.8 7.1 7.4 11.2 15.3 17.4 19.5 19.7 28.6 36.7 38.0 
Total: 102.9 129.1 150.7 163.0 193.1 220.2 275.7 342.5 429.2 523.1 631.1 773.2 967.5 
Source: Central Statistical Office, The Gross Domestic Product.of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 









1974 1977 1974 1977 
Food Processors 86 92 7200 8000 
Textiles, Garments, Headwear 
Footwear 86 89 4500 5900 
Printing, Publishing and 
Paper Converters 46 47 2400 2800 
Wood and Related Products 79 74 2200 2200 
Chemical and Non-metallic 
Products 51 62 3200 3900 
Assembly-type and Related 
Industries 83 88 5900 8200 
Other Manufacture 27 32 1500 1100 
Source: Central Statistical Office. 
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TABLE 12 
INDEX NUMBERS OF EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTIVITY 
AND EARNINGS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 
(Average 1971 = 100) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
a) Employment 
Food Processing 115 116 131 125 125 126 129 
Drink and Tobacco 105 113 115 120 124 129 129 
Textiles and Footwear 100 109 99 104 111 96 88 
Printing and Publishing 96 118 129 134 127 135 136 
Wood Products 100 97 90 93 101 99 101 
Chemical Products 105 109 107 103 104 110 107 
Building Materials 102 106 109 108 116 122 133 
Assembly-type Industries 118 121 93 102 130 158 166 
Metallic Products 108 .123 113 105 110 118 129 
Miscellaneous Industries 120 158 144 152 149 144 164 
b) Pro due t ivi ty 
Food Processing 95 95 100 118 122 121 124 
Drink and Tobacco 105 110 116 113 117 109 107 
Textiles and Footwear 75 64 85 75 79 83 84 
Printing and Publishing 114 112 114 . 89 89 11 z 110 
Wood Products 77 72 84 82 98 98 71 
Chemical Products 104 80 83 91 100 ß2 87 
Building Materials 111 105 93 94 88 91 90 
Assembly-type Industries 107 107 121 116 107 10.6 95 
Metallic Products 93 108 123 152 251 338 420 
Miscellaneous Industries. 114 73 83 93 99 77 93 
c) Weekly Earnings 
Food Processing 110 119 131 157 182 207 286 
Drink and Tobacco 107 121 . 145 157 188 235 308 




1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Printing and Publishing 106 118 140 163 185 232 263 
Wood Products 104 123 141 167 194 233 275 
Chemical Products 113 123 148 184 204 240 299 
Building Materials 105 122 135 147 165 2.30 276 
Assembly-type Industries 104 116 160 177 204 248 330 
Metallic Products 106 121 132 164 206 274 307 
Miscellaneous Industries 102 102 . 122 137 168 242 302 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Annual Statistical Digest, 
1978 and earlier. 
( 
